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The Medium is the Mistake: The Law of 
Software for the First Amendment 
R. Polk Wagner* 
is computer software-code written by humans that instructs a computer to 
pe1jorm certain tasks- protected by the Firs t Amendment ? The answer to this 
question will significantly impact the course of futu re technological regulation 
and will affect the scope of free expression rights in new media. in this note, R. 
Polk Wagner sets forth aframeworkfor analys is of this issue, noting at the out-
set that the truly important question in this context is the threshold question· 
Wha t is "speech or . .. the press "? Wagner first describes two ways that the 
Supreme Court has addressed the threshold question One is ontological-fo-
cusing on the expressive content of the speaker's conduct or the medium cho-
sen The second approach is teleological- determining whether the regulation 
at issue implicates free expression Wagne r argues that the teleological 
mode-especially as applied to computer software and other new media- is the 
more likely to be consistently speech-protective, and that the courts that have 
addressed computer software have mistakenly opted for the ontological, me-
dium-focused analysis. Use of a teleological approach implies that there 
should be no "law of software, " a conclusion that Wagner argues holds the 
most promise for extending robust First Amendment protections into new medi-
wns of communication. 
Each method of communicating ideas is "a law unto itself' and that law must 
reflect the "differing natures , values, abuses and dangers" of each method. 
- Metromedia, Inc. v. San Diego 1 
There's truth in the old saw that familiarity breeds contempt: nobody goes to 
Speakers Comer to listen. 
-John Hart Ely2 
* J.D., Stanford Law School, 1998; B.S. E., University of Michigan, 1993. The author wishes 
to extend thanks to Professors John Hart Ely, Tom Grey, Margaret Jane Radin, and Kathleen Sulli-
van, to the participants in the Legal Studies Colloquium at Stanford Law School for helpful com-
ments and suggestions, and to Paul Epstein and Tyler Newby of the Stanford Law Review for their 
editing. Their assistance greatly strengthened thi s paper; its remaining weaknesses are mine alone. 
I. 453 U.S. 490,50 1 (1981) (quoting Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 97 (1949) (Jackson, J. , 
concurring)). 
2. John Hart Ely , Flag Desecration: A Case Study in the Roles of Categorization and Bal-
ancing in First Amendment Analysis, 88 H ARV. L. REV. 1482, 1489 (1975). 
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It IS Saturday, somewhere in Silicon Valley. Debra , a young computer 
programmer, is putting the finishing touches on a revolutionary new software 
product, Lucifer. 3 Written in the programming language known as JavaTM, 
Debra intends to make Lucifer available to computer users on a variety of 
popular platforn1s. An experienced programmer, she understands that pro-
gramming is a curious mixture of science and art, the pragmatic and the ele-
gant. There is much original thought built into Debra 's program, such as her 
ideas about proper logical organization , or the best language in which to pro-
gram. But her creativity is highly constrained by the very fact that she is 
writing a set of instructions to drive a machine. In fact, in order to make the 
program useful, she must convert the Java code she understands into a lan-
guage that the machine 's processor understands- a process known as com-
pilation . Once compilation is complete, the software can be used to operate a 
computer in the way in which she intended. 
Debra 's intent in writing Lucifer is complex. Lucifer is designed to 
break into--"hack"-corporate and government computer systems. Debra 
knows that hacking is against the law,4 but she persists nonetheless for sev-
eral reasons. First, she believes that the laws against hacking are mi sguided, 
serving only to lull corporations and governments into a false sense of secu-
rity about the invulnerability of their networks . Additionally, she hopes to 
share her ideas about programming by letting other programmers see and use 
her work.5 Finally, Debra hopes to make money by marketing Lucifer soft-
ware to corporations and governments as a tool for analyzing the strength of 
their security systems.6 
Can Debra be prosecuted under a law making it illegal to develop hack-
ing software? Or does Lucifer raise First Amendment questions, limiting the 
power of government to stop Debra's programming and distribution activi-
ties? Hacking is conduct, but programming is at least partially expression. 
And Debra's creation of Lucifer clearly has expressive motivations, just as 
3. Both Lucifer and Debra are fictional , though their story is inspired by the program called 
"Satan" written by software programmers Wietse Venema and Dan Farmer. See John Markoff, 
Dismissal of Security Expert Adds Fuel to In ternet Debate, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 22, 1995, at D4 (de-
scribing "Satan" and its writers' plans for its release) . 
4. See generally Xan Raskin & Jeannie Schaldach-Paiva, Computer Crimes, 33 AM. CPJM. L. 
REV. 541 (1996) (s urveying different types of computer crime). Every state except Vermont has 
enacted some form of computer-crime statute. See id. at 563 & n. 153 . 
5. Cf Whitney v. Cal ifornia, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (192 7) (Brandeis, J., concurring) ("[F]reedom 
to think as you will and speak as you think are means indispensable to the discovery and spread of 
political truth. "). 
6. Cf United States v. National Treasury Employees Uni on, 513 U.S. 454, 468 (1 995) (hold-
ing that a "prohibition on compensation unquestionably imposes a significant burden on expressive 
activity"). 
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Gregory Lee Johnson made his point by buming a flag in Dallas.7 But does 
the programming of Lucifer itself-\vriting the computer software or code-
fa ll within "speech" or the "press" as did Johnson 's activity?8 First Amend-
ment doctrine "has often faced the problem of applying the broad principles 
of the First Amendment to unique forum s of express ion."9 
The First Amendment generally forbids laws "abridging the freedom of 
speech, or of the press." 10 While the courts and commentators have spared 
littl e ink m providing content to the limits of govemment activity with re-
spect to speech and the press, they have paid considerably less attention to a 
logically anterior question : What is it , exactly, that "bring[s] the First 
Amendment into play?" 11 
When the forum of communication involved is the spoken or \Vfitten 
word, courts and commentators do not linger long on this question. 12 Called 
"relatrvely minor First Amendment doctrine ," 13 the threshold question may 
seem but a smalli sh bump on the road to substanti ve First Amendment analy-
sis-a procedural footnote to the grand tenets of "time, place, and manner" 
or "balancing tests." 14 Further, even when the threshold question is consid-
ered, it is often read as an epithet announcing a result rather than as the prod-
uct of careful analysis. 15 
However, the threshold question-determining what is speech or the 
press-is critically important. A complete First Amendment analysis re-
7. See Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 420 ( 1989) (striking down conviction under a state 
flag desecration law). 
8. U.S. CONST. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom of speech, 
or of the press .... "). 
9. Metromedia, Inc. v. San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 500 (1981 ). 
10. U.S . CONST. amend. I. 
II. Johnson , 491 U.S. at 404. 
12. See, e.g., New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 265-66 (1964) (applying First 
Amendment standards to an "editorial advertisement" published in a newspaper). See generally 
LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERJCAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 789-94 (1988) (discussi ng two "tracks" 
of First Amendment analysis). But see Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisex ual Group, 
515 U.S. 55 7, 568-70 ( 1995) (finding that a parade was a form of protected expression); Barnes v. 
Glen Theatre, Inc. , 501 U.S. 560, 565-66 (1991) ("(N]ude dancing ... is expressive conduct within 
the outer perimeters of the First Amendment."); Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 406, 409-10 
( 1974) (per curiam) (stating that affixing a peace symbol to a flag was a form of communication). 
13 . Robert Post, Recuperaling Firs/ Amendmenl Doclrine, 47 STAN. L. RE V. 1249, 1252 
( 1995). 
14. See. e.g. , id. at 1260-70 (discussing the time, place, and manner test). 
15 . See, e.g., United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367,376 (1968) (assuming First Amendment 
protection for draft card burning in holding that the government's interest in restricting it was justi-
fi ed under the Constitution). Professor Tribe notes that "the di stinction between speech and con-
duct must be seen at best as announcing a conclusion of the Court, rather than as summarizing in 
any way the analytic processes which led the Court to that conclusion." TRJBE, supra note 12, at 
827. 
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quires three generalized steps. First is the threshold questiOn: Is freedom of 
speech and the press implicated? If so, the analysis moves to the second 
step: What is the level of scrutiny to be applied to the government action at 
issue? Once the court answers this question, the third step controls: Does 
the justification for the regulation meet the scrutiny imposed? In effect, any 
one of these steps may be dispositive. Laws that do not implicate the First 
Amendment do not receive First Amendment review. 16 A "strict scrutiny" 
standard, in most cases, will be the death knell for the regulation at issue .17 
And even if it does not fully resolve the issue, the threshold question affects 
governmental activities by determining whether content-neutral justifications 
must be made for the regulation .18 
The threshold issue typically attracts attention when new modes of 
communication are used- and regulated. Union picketers are charged under 
a state antipicketing law. 19 A young man bums his draft card,20 defaces the 
American flag, 21 or bums it. 22 The development and expansion of technol-
ogy in particular raises the threshold question. Computer programmers at-
tempt to export encryption software code;23 our Debra and her Lucifer soft-
ware raise similar questions about what qualifies as speech. 
This note investigates the operation of the First Amendment threshold 
test in an effort to determine the "law of software." Part I identifies two 
separate methods of threshold analysis employed by the Supreme Court: 
16. See. e.g., Barnes, 501 U.S. at 578 (Scalia, J. , concurring) (explaining the limitations of 
First Amendment applicability); Arcara v. Cloud Books , Inc., 478 US. 697 , 707 (1986) (holding 
that a statute permitting the closure of a bookstore where solicitation of prost itution took place did 
not implicate the First A mendment). 
17. See, e.g., R.A.V. v. St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377,395-96 (1992) (holding that a "hate crime" or-
dinance prohibiting the display of a symbol calculated to arouse anger on the basis of race was not 
narrowly tailored-and therefore constitutionally invalid- because it was content-specific); Spence, 
418 U.S. at 411-15 (1974) (per curiam) (finding that affixing a peace symbol to a flag did not sig-
nificantly impair the state's interest in preserving the flag's physical integrity). 
18. Compare Arcaro, 478 U.S. at 706-07 (declining to apply First Amendment principles to 
"a public health regulation of general application"), with Clark v. Community for Creative Non-
Violence, 468 U.S. 288 (1984) (allowing the government to prevent camping in a park for content-
neutral reasons). One suspects that the resolution of the threshold question will detem1ine, at the 
very least, whether the case is resolved in pretrial motions or at trial. See, e.g., GERALD GUNTHER 
& KATHLEEN M. SU LLIVAN, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1210 (13th ed. 1997) (discussing the differ-
ence in scrutiny between content-neutral and content-based regulations). 
19. See Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940) (declaring that peaceful picketing is 
speech). 
20. See O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 369. 
21. See Spence, 418 U.S. at 405. 
22. See Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989). 
23. See, e.g., Bernstein v. United States Dep't of State, 922 F. Supp. 1426, 1429-30, 1436 
(N.D. Cal. 1996) (holding that computer source code is speech protected by the First Amendment) ; 
Karn v. United States Dep't of State, 925 F. Supp. I, 3-4 (D.O. C. 1996) (holding that export re-
strictions on cryptographic source code did not violate the First Amendment). 
I 
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ontological and teleologica!Y+ The ontological mode-also properly re-
ferred to as "mode-specific"- looks to the activities of the speaker as a gUide 
to whether free expression is implicated. If the speaker is "speaking," then 
the First Amendment is triggered. 25 The ontological analysis encompasses 
more than the speech-conduct distinction, however. The Supreme Court also 
uses the medium of communication chosen by the speaker as the basis for the 
threshold detem1ination. 26 The teleological mode, on the other hand, makes 
no reference to the speaker's activities or choice of medium. Instead, it fo-
cuses squarely on whether the governmental interests that support the regu-
lation are related to the suppression of tree expression.27 If these interests are 
not related to free expression, then the analysis is complete; the First 
Amendment is not implicated. 
Part II analyzes the law of software as applied to this threshold frame-
work. The teleological mode, of course, rejects any categorization of medi-
ums, and thus lends no guidance to (or support for) a law of software. How-
ever, application of the ontological approach to the particularities of com-
puter software exposes fundamental weaknesses in the mode of analysis, 
leading to a questioning of this approach, at least as applied to new media. A 
threshold focus on the mode of communication-the expressive content of 
the speaker's activities or the medium in which they are conducted-is un-
likely to provide strong protection for First Amendment values in the new 
24. n1ese terms were originally employed by Professor Ely in a similar context. See Ely. su-
pra note 2, at 1496. 
25. See Johnson, 491 U.S. at 403-06; see also Spence, 418 U.S. at 409-11. 
26. See Hurley v. Irish-American Gay Lesbian and Bisexual Group, 515 U.S. 557, 568 (I 995) 
(finding that a public parade is a "form of expression"); Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 
565-67 ( 1991) (holding that nude dancing gets some First Amendment protection); Ward v. Rock 
Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 790 ( 1989) ("[M]usic, as a form of expression and communication, 
is protected under the First Amendment."); Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 108-12 (1943) 
(approving First Amendment protection for the sale of religious handbills); cf Winter v. G.P. Put-
nam's Sons, 938 F.2d I 033, I 035 (9th Cir. 1991) (stating that a guide to mushrooms "is pure 
thought and expression" not covered by state products liability laws); City of Dallas v. Stanglin, 
490 U.S. 19, 25 ( 1989) (finding that a gathering for recreational dancing is not "expressive associa-
tion"). 
27. See R.A.V. v. St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 393-96 (1992) (holding that a city ordinance pro-
hibiting incendiary speech toward racial groups was unconstitutional because it selectively pre-
vented the expression of particular ideas); Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 50 I U.S. 663, 669-70 
(1991) (holding that promissory estoppel was a law of general application that did not single out the 
press); Barnes, SO! U.S. at 577-79 (Scalia, J. , concurring) ("[T]he only First Amendment analysis 
applicable to laws that do not directly or indirectly impede speech is the threshold inquiry of 
whether the purpose of the law is to suppress communication.") (quoting Community for Creative 
Non-Violence v. Watt, 703 F.2d 586, 622-23 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (en bane) (Scalia, J., dissenting)); see 
also United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310, 315-18 (1990) (striking down the federal Flag Protec-
tion Act because the government interest was related to the suppression of free expression); Arcara 
v. Cloud Books , Inc., 478 U.S. 697, 702-07 (1986) (finding that a statute permitting the closure of 
places in which prostitution was solicited was not aimed at limiting expressive activity). 
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media context. This note concludes that the teleological approach, though 
imperfect , may be better suited to the developing technology of new media 
communications. That is, fo r First Amendment threshold purposes, the " law 
of software" simply should not exist. 
I. F ROM O NTOLOGY TO TELEOLOGY: T HE M ODES OF T HRESHOL D 
A NA LYSI S 
Lest any readers have lingering susp icions about the existence of a First 
Amendment threshold question, thi s part will address that issue before mov-
ing further. The underlying logic of thi s point is that courts can uphold 
regulations alleged to be prohibited by the First Amendment "on the ground 
that they need not be evaluated according to First Amendment standards," 
and they can uphold the very same regulations because they "withstand con-
sti tutional scrutiny."28 Therefore, some sort of boundary criteria must be 
established to detennine whether First Amendment standards will be brought 
to bear. The Supreme Court has repeatedly recognized thi s threshold deter-
mination, both expressly and implicitly . In Spence v. Washington,29 the 
Court noted as an initial matter that "[i]t is therefore necessary to determine 
whether [Spence's] activity was sufficientl y imbued with elements of com-
munication to fa ll within the scope of the First and Fourteenth Amend-
ments."30 In Clark v. Community for Creative Non- Violence,31 the Court 
noted that the detem1ination (or assumption) of whether "expressive con-
duct" is present "begins the inquiry ."32 In Arcm·a v. Cloud Books,33 the 
Court dismissed First Amendment concerns, concluding that "the First 
Amendment is not implicated by the enforcement of a public health regula-
tion of general application. "34 
That the threshold question is not always explicitly answered by the 
Court35 does not mean that it does not exist. Where a set of facts concededly 
implicates speech or the press, there is obviously little need to linger on the 
28. Post, supra note 13, at 1250. 
29. 41 8 U.S . 405 ( 1974) (per curi am). 
30. Jd at 409. 
31. 468 u.s. 288 ( 1984). 
32. !d. at 293. 
33. 478 U.S. 697 ( 1986). 
34. !d. at 707. 
35. In fact, the tlu-eshold qu esti on is rarely- too rarely in the author's view-addressed. 
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issue .36 In Texas v. Johnson,37 the Co urt noted that the fact that Jolmson vvas 
not convicted for uttering words "somewhat complicates [the] considera-
tion"38 of the First Amendment issues, by requiring that the Court "first de-
termine" whether the case implicated the First Amendment at all. 39 Plainly, 
it is only where the threshold question matters-where one side or the other 
chooses to make it an issue-that the analysi s is undertaken. 
Here we deal wi th computer software, a situation where, as we shall see, 
the threshold question does matter.~0 
A. Ontological Threshold Analysis 
When the Court does ask the threshold question, one method by which it 
approaches the issue is ontologically. That is , it looks to the purported 
spea ker 's activities to determine whether they possess sufficient communi-
cative elements to bring the First Amendment into play. The most recogniz-
able version of this mode of analysis is the Court's speech-conduct distinc-
tion first hinted at in United States v. 0 'Brien,41 given content in Spence v. 
Washington, and reaffirmed in Texas v. Johnson. 
The crux of the speech-conduct distinction is that while "speech" IS 
highly protected, "conduct" is not.42 The task of courts under this rubric IS 
36. Paradigm atic cases here include those tha t expli cit ly bear on speech or the press, the spo-
ken or written word. See, e.g., Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minnesota Comm'r of Revenue, 
460 U.S. 575 (1983) (striking down, on First Amendment grounds, a tax directed at newspapers); 
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1 964) (addressing libe l laws directed at newspa-
pers). 
37. 491 U.S. 397 (1989). 
38 ld at 402-03 (1989). 
39. ld 
40. Of course, it is possibl e to argue that since computer so ftware code can be printed out, 
software is clearly "speech" or "press," obvi ating the need for threshold analysis. For example, the 
District Court for the Northern District of Californi a, in Bernstein v. United Stales Department of 
State, 922 F. Supp. 1426 (N.D. Cal. 1996), came close to stating this argument. The District Court 
noted that, because the plaintiffs "encryption system is written, albeit in computer language rather 
than in English," expressi veness of conduct need not be considered. !d. at 1434-35. But rather than 
obviating the threshold question, the District Court was choosing a particular form of the ontologi-
cal mode of threshold analysis. That is, instead of evaluating the speaker 's conduct, the court 
evaluated the speaker's choice of medium. Because software code could be printed out (or "writ-
ten"), it was thus evaluated to be speech. See id. 
41. 391 U.S. 367 (1968). In this case, the majority stated that "we cannot accept the view that 
an apparently limitl ess variety of conduct can be labeled 'speech ' whenever the person engaging in 
the conduct intends thereby to express an idea." !d. at 376. But as Professor Ely noted, this state-
ment was a "false lead" to the true holding of the 0 'Brien Court, which moved on to focus on the 
interests of the regulation as the threshold question. See Ely, supra note 2, at 1494-96 (citing 
O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 377). 
42. See Johnson, 491 U.S . at 406 ("[T]he government generally has a freer hand in restricting 
expressive conduct than it has in restricting the written or spoken word."). 
394 STANFORD LA!+,. REVIEW [Vol.51 :387 
"to determine whether [the speaker's] activity was suffic iently imbued with 
elements of communication" to trigger the protections of the F irst Amend-
ment.43 In making this determination, the Court has asked whether (1) " [a]n 
intent to convey a particularized message was present," and (2) "the likeli-
hood was great that the message would be understood by those who viewed 
it."44 If both elements are present, then the Court will apply First Amend-
ment analys1s.45 
Unfortunately , fundamental fallacies underli e the speech-conduct di-
chotomy. It simply cannot be disputed that "[t]o some extent express ion and 
action are al ways mingled; most conduct includes elements of both ."46 In 
fact, as Professor Ely has pointed out: " [B]uming a draft card to express op-
position to the draft is an undifferentiated whole, l 00% act ion and 100% ex-
pression. It involves no conduct that is not at the same time communication, 
and no communication that does not result from conduct."4 7 
Moreover, the test is quite difficult to administer in practice; it is not at 
all clear where on the spectrum of speech versus conduct a particular ac ti vity 
may fall. While I cannot be prevented from publicly speaking or writing 
"Wagner fo r Congress ," blasting the same on loudspeakers at three in the 
morning may be regulated.48 Indeed, by the tern1s of Spence, a flag burning 
defendant would have as strong a claim to First Amendment protection as 
one who defaced public property with written graffiti, if not stronger.49 This 
43. Spence v. Was hin gton, 418 U.S. 405 , 409 ( 1974) (per curiam). 
44. Johnso n, 491 U.S . at 404 (quoting Spence, 418 U.S. at 4 10-11). 
45. See, e.g, Spence, 418 U.S. at 415 (finding that display ing a flag with a peace symbol con-
veyed a particular message "likely to be understood, and with in the contours of the First Amend-
ment"); Johnson, 49 1 U.S. at 406 (finding that in burning a fl ag, Johnsen 's expression was "both 
intenti onal and overwhelm ingly apparent"). Thi s anal ys is does not always involve heightened 
scrutiny. 
46. THOMAS I. EM ERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESS ION 80 ( 1970). "Moreover, 
if the expression invol ves talk , it may be noi sy; if written , it may become litter." TRIBE, supra note 
12, at 827 (citing Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 (1949) (uphold ing an ordinance prohi b iting th e 
use of sound trucks on public s treets) and Schneid er v. Irvington , 308 U.S. 147 (1939) (upholding 
an ordinance barring the distribution of leafle ts as a means of reducing litter)). 
47. Ely, supra note 2, at 1495. The Co urt appears to have tried to rectify the speec h-conduct 
distinction by noting th at its importance is substantive rather than proced ural. The government 
"may not ... proscribe particular conduct because it has express ive elements." Johnson, 491 U.S . 
at 406. But the fac t remains that expression and action are an "undifferentiated w hole . .. and to 
outlaw the act is therefore necessaril y to regul ate both [the ac ti ve and express ive) elements." Ely, 
supra note 2, at 1496 . 
48. See, e.g. , Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 89 (1949 (allowing res trictions on " loud and 
raucous" sound trucks). 
49. Under Spence, the flag burner would have to show tha t the "contex t in w hich [the flag was 
burned) for purposes of expression" was suc h that those who viewed it would be likel y to under-
s tand the message. Spence, 418 U.S. at 4 10. A defacer could obviate th is prong of the anal ysis by, 
for example, spray-painting "Impeach Clinton." 
I 
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analysis is also clearly subject to problems of characterizati on, as conduct 
"cannot be labeled 'speech ' whenever the person engaging in the conduct 
intends thereby to express an idea. "50 
The Court appeared to drop the speech-conduct di stinction after Spence, 
re surrecting it only in Texas v. Johnson fifteen years later .5i More recently, 
the Court criticized the first factor (the "particularized message" require-
ment) of the Spence framework in Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian 
and Bisexual Group. 52 Justice Souter spoke for a unanimous court when he 
stated tha t "a narrow, succinctly articulable message is not a condi tion of 
constitutional protection, which if confined to express ions conveying a ' par-
ticularized message, ' would never reach the unquestionably shielded painting 
of Jackson Pollock, music of Arnold Schoenberg, or Jabberwocky verse of 
Lewis Carroll. "53 
In addition to the speech-conduct dichotomy, which has attTacted schol-
arly attention , 5 ~ the Court has used another version of the ontological ap-
proach to the threshold question. This approach fo cuses upon the medium of 
communication chosen by the speaker, which triggers (or does not trigger) 
First Amendment protec tions depending on whether the medium is tradition-
al ly and familiarly considered to be one which implicates the First Amend-
ment.55 Rather than receiving protection because of their content, these types 
of expression are favored because their medium is favored or, in other words, 
50. Un ited States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367,376 (1968). 
51. See Johnson, 491 U.S. at 404 (acknowledging that conduct "suffici entl y imbued with 
elemen ts of communication" may qualify for First Amendment protecti on) (quoring Spence, 41 8 
U.S. at 409). 
52. 515U.S.557(1 995). 
53. !d at 569 (c itations omitted). 
54. See, e.g, EM ERSON, supra note 46, at 16-17 (outlining importan t factors for gaining First 
Amendment protection); Ely, supra note 2, at 149 1-96 (discuss ing the dichotomy in flag burning 
cases) ; Louis Henkin, The Supreme Court, 1967 Term- Foreword: On Drawing Lines, 82 HARV. L. 
REv. 63 , 76-82 (1968) (discussing problems with the dichotomy); Melville B. Nimmer, The ivfean -
ing of Symbolic Speech Under the First Amendment, 21 UCLA L. REV. 29, 29-38 ( 1973) (d iscuss-
ing when conduct constitutes speech); Laurence R. Vel vel , Freedom of Speech and the Draft Card 
Buming Cases, 16 U. KAN L. REv. 149, 149-62 (1968) (discussing the dichotomy in draft card 
burning cases) . 
55. Professor Tribe notes several "activities that have histori cally been recognized as inextri-
cably intertwined wi th speech or petition ... all of these ac tiviti es might variously be described, 
wi thout special illumination, either as 'speech' or as 'conduct, ' but all must be recogni zed as acti vi-
ties of special first amendment significance." TRIB E, supra note 12, at 829-30. He includes in thi s 
list outdoor distribution of leaflets, door-to-door political canvassing, solicitati on of contributions, 
mailbox-stuffing, picketing, civil rights demonstrations, boycotts , communicating with the govern-
ment, and putting up outdoor posters and signs. See id. 
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because they "refl ect an exercise of these basic constitu tional ri ghts m their 
most pri stine and classic fom1." 56 
The medium-specific version of the ontological threshold analysis re-
quires courts first to evaluate the medium through which the allegedly in-
fringed speech is being transmitted. In Hurley, the Court began its analysis 
by noting that "[p ]arades are thus a fom1 of expression, not just motion ."57 
In Jvfe tromedia . In c. v. San Diego,53 the Court highlighted the " uniqueness of 
each med ium of expression" by noting that " [ e ]ach method of communicat-
ing ideas is a ' law unto itself."'59 The idea here-at least with respect to the 
threshold analysis- is that there is a "list" of traditional or famili ar mediums. 
This ra ises several important points. 
First, the " list" of media given such favorable treatment has changed 
over time.60 Take the case of motion pictures. In 1915, the Court, in i\lfutual 
Film Corp. v. Industrial Comm ission,61 rejected a challenge to an exp lic itly 
content-based licen sing statute. The statute allowed only films of a "moral , 
educationa l or amusing and harmless character" to be approved.6=' Noting 
first that films "may be used for evil ,"63 the Court engaged in a b it of nega-
tive medium-specific analysis: Movies were "not to be regarded, nor in-
tended to be regarded .. . we think, as part of the press of the country or as 
organs of public opinion."64 Twenty-seven years later, in Joseph Burstyn, 
56. Hu rley, 515 U.S. at 568-69 (quoting Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229, 235 
(1963)). 
57. !d. at 568. 
58. 453 U.S . 490 ( 198 1 ). 
59. !d. at 50 1 & n.S. It should, of co urse, be noted at the outset that the " freq uent refrain" of 
medium-specificity is not unique to threshold analysis . Much of the "categorizi ng" of substantive 
First Am endment law is closely related to the medium in question. For example, the Court accords 
lower constitutional protection to speech conducted over the wirel ess broadcast medium. See Red 
Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 386-40 I ( 1969) (upholding the fairness doctrine, which 
requires that public issues be presented by broadcasters and that each side should be given fa ir cov-
erage) . But the Court extends heightened protection to cable broadcasting, telephone, and the Inter-
net. See Reno v . ACLU, 117 S. Ct. 2329, 2341-44 (1997) (holding co ntent-based res trictions on the 
Internet unconstitutional ); Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S . 622, 661-64 ( 1994) (requiring 
intermediate scrutiny for cable regulation); Sable Comm. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 128 , 131 ( 1989) 
(finding statutory ban on certain telephone messages uncons titutional). The importance of the me-
dium in the ultimate substantive analysis further supports the proposition that in many cases the 
medium will be critical to the threshold determination as well. 
60. Professor Post argues that a medium should be added to th e list when the social conven-
tions surrounding the medi um create constitutionall y meaningful rela tionships between the med ium 
and ideas. See Post, supra note 13, at 1253-54. This is as sound a reason as any, though the Court 
is probably not that analytical about what is, by nature, a strikingly ad hoc proposition . 
61. 236 U.S . 230 (1915). 
62. !d. at 241 (quoting 1913 Ohio Laws 399). 
63. !d. at 242 . 
64. ld at 244. 
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Inc. v. Wilson ,65 the Court changed its tune and overruled Jvfutual Film .66 In 
Burstyn, the Court struck down a statute permitting the banning of " sacrile-
gious" movies on the grounds that "m otion pictures are a significant m edium 
for the communication of ideas."67 
Second, the medium-specific approach can be as easily used to "down-
grade" purported expression as to protect it . For example, courts do not con-
sider the First Amendment to be implicated by "products" such as aeronauti -
cal charts. In Winter v. G.P. Putnam's Sons, 68 the Ninth Circuit expla ined 
that aeronautical charts were in a special class of materials- a "medium," so 
to speak- that are more like physical products than books. 69 
Third, the medium-speci fic approach is as likely to be arbitrarily applied 
as the speech-conduct distinction . On the one hand, City ofDallas v. Stan-
glin 70 te1ls us that "recreational dancing" is not a protected expressive act i v-
ity.71 On the other, the plurality opinion in Barnes V. Glen nzeatre, lnc72 
stated that nude barroom dancing is "within the outer perimeters of the First 
Amendment."73 Clearly, there is ample room within the medium-specific 
framework for judicial value judgmcnts.74 However, the essential failing of 
the medium-specific approach is that, by its very nature, it will protect only 
orthodox mediums of communication. "There's truth in the old saw that fa-
miliarity breeds contempt: nobody goes to Speakers' Corner to listen. "75 
65. 343 u.s. 495 (1952). 
66. See id at 502. 
67. !d at 497, 50 I. 
68 . 938 F.2d I 033 (9th Cir. 1991 ). 
69. See id. at I 035-36. Significantly, the court included computer software in this product 
classification. See id at 1036; see also Brocklesby v. Jeppesen, 767 F.2d 1288, 1294-95 (9th Cir. 
1985) (holding that aeronautical charts are products in product li ability suits); Saloomey v. Jeppe-
sen, 707 F.2d 671, 676-77 (2d Cir. 1983) (holding that navigational charts are products); Post, su-
pra note 13, at 1254 & n.20 (explaining that courts in cases like Brock!esby do not think of the suits 
as raising First Amendment questions). It is not difficult to imagine how the argument might pro-
ceed for such charts. The cartographer would avow an intent to convey a message (perhaps the 
message of the safety and of the enjoyment of flyi ng) and would attempt to show how the message 
is particularly developed. He or she would then argue, rather plausibly, that the consumers of the 
charts would be able to discern this message. 
70. 490 u.s. 19 (1989). 
71. See id. at 23-25. 
72. 501 u.s. 560 (1991). 
73. !d. at 566. Justice Souter justified thi s distinction because nude barroom dancing is "a 
performance directed to an ac tual or hypothetical audi ence." !d. at 581 (Souter, J ., concurring). 
74. Cf JOHN HARTEL Y, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDI CIAL REVIEW 44-
48 ( 1980) (arguing that the judge's own values are often a source of constitutional judgment, but 
that such a practice is unacceptable). 
75. Ely, supra note 2, at 1488-89. 
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This mode of analysis will favor older, more establi shed, and more litigated 
fom1s of communication- at the expense of new media. 76 
B. Teleological Threshold Analysis 
In R.A. V. v. St. Paul,77 the Court reJ ected any form of ontological thresh-
o ld analysis when it struck down a statute criminalizi ng "bias-motivated" 
fighting words. It noted instead that the di spositive (and sole) necessary 
analysis was that "[t]he First Amendment does not pennit St. Paul to impose 
special prohibitions on those speakers who express views on disfavored 
subjects."78 Thus, the Court explicated a second mode of threshold analysi s, 
a teleological one, which is wholl y separate from the activities of the 
speaker. 79 Thi s method asks whether the regulat10n is intended to suppress 
free expression. If it is not, the First Amendment is simply not implicated. 
Justice Scalia, concurring in the judgment in Barnes v. Glen Th eatre, Inc. , 
explicitly noted the procedural nature of the teleological inquiry: 
76. Ind eed, one must consider flag burning, if not draft card burning, p:uades , and music, to 
be recent additions to the " lis t" of medi a that implicate the First Amendment. It remains an open 
question whether the inevi tabl e enlargement o f the scope of the medium-spec ific threshold will 
render th is mode of analys is useless. 
77. 505U S.377(1 992). 
78 . !d. at 391. 
79 . In the tel eological mode of analysis , the threshold ques tion is necess aril y the primary 
question asked in a substantive balancing of the interes ts of the government and speaker. There-
fore, courts using the teleological approach will, in effect, "co mpress" the anal ys is into two interre-
lated steps rather than three: The court first determines whether or not the regulation is related to 
free expression and then determines the level of scrutiny to be applied. See. e.g. , id. at 391-96 
(fi nding that an ordinance suppressing fighting words that provoke violence on the basis of race, 
color, creed, religion, or gender is content-based and facially unconstituti onal). 
This line of analysis is related to the doctrine of impern1issibl e motives, where the "substantive 
mo ti va tion" tes t is primaril y concerned with viewpoint discrimination. Sec, e.g., Cornelius v. 
NAACP Legal Defense & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 806-11 ( 1985) (noting the importance of 
motivation analysis while upholding an executive order limiting participation in a charity drive); 
Perry Education Ass' n v. Perry Local Educators ' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 50-55 (1983) (finding no 
evidence of viewpoint discrimination when scrutinizi ng a school board 's choi ce to grant preferen-
tia l access to the inter-school mail system to the union currently representing teachers); Consoli-
dated Edison Co. v. Public Service Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530,536 (1980) ("[W]hen [the] regulation is 
based on the content of speech, governmental action must be scrutinized more carefully to ensure 
that communication has not been prohibited 'merely because public officials disapprove [of] the 
speaker's views. "') (citation omitted). See generally TRJ BE, supra note 12, at 8 14-21 (considering 
fac ially neutral regulations motivated by content censo rship) ; Paul Brest, Palmer v. Thompson: An 
Approach to the Problem of Unconstitutional Legislative Motive, 1971 SUP. CT. REV. 95 (arguing 
tha t courts should inquire into legislati ve motivations when they are ascertainable and when other 
grounds are not available) ; John Hart Ely, Legislative and Administrarive Motivation in Constitu-
tional Law, 79 YALE L.J. 1205 (1970) (defending the rel evancy of legislati ve and administrative 
motivations in determining the constitutionality of government actions). 
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All ou r holdings (though admittedly not some of our discuss ion) support the 
conclusion that "the onl y First Amen dment ana lysis ap plicable to laws th at do 
not directl y or indirect ly impede speech is the threshold inqu1 ry of whether the 
purpose of the law is to suppress communicati on . If not, that is the end of the 
matter so far as the First Amen dment guarantees are concerned; if so, the court 
th en proceeds to determine whether th ere IS substantial justification for the pro-
scription ."80 
399 
Scali a stated that the Indiana statute was one of general applicability because 
it did not single out nude dancing, and thus convictions under the public in-
decency law were valid since the First Amendment was not implicated.81 
·' Indiana does not regul ate dancing. It regulates public nudi ty ."82 
Cohen v. Cowles Media Co. 83 is another example of the teleological ap-
proach to threshold analysi s. Rej ecting a claim by a newspaper of First 
Amendment immuni ty from state promissory estoppel Jaws, the Court noted 
that the "Minnesota doctrine of promissory estoppel is a law of general ap-
plicabili ty . It does not target or single out the press."8.J Thus, the First 
Amendment did not apply.85 
Whil e a strict teleological approach might be criti cized for providing too 
little protection to speech,86 the evidence to date does not entirely support 
this view. At least five opinions have utilized the teleological threshold ap-
proach . In two, the threshold test tri ggered the protecti on of the First 
Amendment and the Court struck down the regulation at issue .87 
More general criticisms of a purpose-based threshold test are similar to 
those enunciated against the substanti ve moti vation analysis used in First 
80. 501 U.S. 560, 578 (1 99 1) (quoting Community for Creati ve Non-Violence v. Watt, 703 
F.2d 586, 622-23 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (en bane) (Scalia, J. , dissenting)). 
81. See id. at 573-76. Justice Scalia drew support for this proposi tion fro m the Court' s deci -
sions relating to the free exercise of religion. See id. at 579 (citing Employment Div., Dep't. of 
Human Resources v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990) (holding that general laws not specificall y tar-
geted at reli gious practices did not require heightened First Amendment scrutiny even though they 
dimini shed some people 's ability to practice their reli gion)). 
82. fd at 572-73 (quoting Miller v. Southbend, 904 F.2d I 08 1, 1120 (7th Cir. 1990)). 
83. 50 1 U.S. 663 (1 99 1). 
84. Id at 670. 
85. See id. at 672 (holding that the First Amendment does not confer on the press a constitu-
tional right to di sregard promises that would otherwise be enforced under state law). 
86. See, e. g., R.A. V v. St. PauL 505 U.S . 377, 426-28 ( 1992) (Stevens, J , concurring) (argu-
ing that courts should consider the content and context of the speech). 
87. See id. at 391 -93 (striking down, on Fi rs t Amendment grounds, a statute criminalizing 
"bias-moti vated" fi ghting words); United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310, 315-1 9 ( 1990) (holding 
that the fed eral Flag Protection Act viol ated the First Amendment). 
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Amendment viewpoint discrimination cases.88 In Palmer v. Thompson ,89 
Justi ce Black outlined the basic objections to motivation analysis: 
First, it is ex treme ly diffi cu lt for a court to ascert ain th e m otivation , or co ll ec-
tion o f different m otivati ons, that li e behind a legi s lative enactment ... . It is 
diffi cult or impossi b le for any court to determine the "sol e" or " dominant" mo-
ti vat ion behind the choices of a group of legisl ators. Furthermore, th ere is an 
elemen t of futility in a judici al attempt to in validate a law because of th e bad 
mot ives o f its supporters. If the law is struck down for th1 s re ason , rather th an 
because of its fac ial content or effect, it wou ld presumably be valid as soon as 
the legis lature or re levant governing body repassed it for different rcasons.90 
While the analysis of whether a particular enactment is intended to affect 
the communication of ideas may be more straightforward than di scerning an 
impermissible motive in an otherwise permissible regulation, it cannot be 
questioned that this challenge will be significant. Indeed, as Professor Ely 
notes, "[I]t will be next to impossible for a court responsibly to conclude that 
a decision was affected by an unconstitutional motivation whenever it is pos-
sible to articulate a plausible legitimate explanation for the action taken. "9 1 
But this is no reason not to undertake the inquiry-in fact , many regulations 
will not have an equally plausible alternative explanation.92 As such, teleo-
logical analyses seem equally likely to yield good results as any alternative. 
II. THE MISTAKES OF MEDIUM: THE PRES ENT STATE OF THE LAW OF 
SOFTWARE 
As of Fall 1998, three courts had analyzed the "law of sofhvare."93 
These cases involved challenges to the constitutionality of federal export 
88. See GUNTHER & SULLIVAN, supra note 18, at 751-52 , 1217 (d iscussing the difficulty of 
assessing discriminatory motivation and determining legislative or administrative moti vation). 
89. 403 U.S. 21 7 ( 197 1). 
90. ld. at 224-25 (citation omitted) . 
91. ELY , supra note 74 , at 13 8. 
92. For example, the law at issue in R.A. V, which proscribed the use of fighting words only 
when moti vated by racial or religious bias, had few equall y plausible explanat ions. "An ordinance 
not limited to the (dis)favored topics, for exampl e, would have preci sely the same beneficial effect." 
R.A . V , 505 U.S. at 396. 
The Barnes law, on the other hand, is a much closer case. Whi le the s imple proscription of 
public nudity would appear to have less to do with speech and more to do with the social interest in 
order and morality, evidence that the state had not applied the statute to nudity as part of pl ays, 
ballets, or operas hints at a motive with First Amendment implications. See Barnes v. Glen Theatre, 
Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 590 (1991) (White, J., dissenting). 
However, difficult factual scenarios do not obviate the discussion. The Barnes case would be 
equally difficult from a threshold perspective in either ontological approach. 
93. See Junger v. Daley, 8 F. Supp. 2d 708 (N.D. Ohio 1998); Karn v. United States Dep't of 
State, 925 F. Supp. 1 (D.D.C. 1996); Bernstein v. United States Dep' t of State, 922 F. S upp. 1426 
(N.D. Cal. 1996). 
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controls on encryption software-specifically source code and object code .94 
While the fed eral regulations95 do not restrict the export of software in writ-
ten material , like books, they do restrict software exports in "machine read-
able" form. 96 
The first case to be decided was Karn v. United States Department of 
State. 97 Karn challenged the re strictions on the international trade of his 
computer diskette containing cryptographic software samples, claiming that 
the regulatory scheme imposed by the Arn1s Export Control Act was an im-
pennissible prior restraint on free speech.98 In considering the defendant' s 
motion for summary judgment, the court made no explicit ruling on the 
threshold question, though it assumed for the purposes of the decision that 
the medium of source code may indeed trigger the protections of the First 
Amendment 99 Nonetheless, the court granted the summary judgment mo-
tion, holding that the government's rationale, not the forn1 of speech or ex-
pression, controls the level of scrutiny. 100 The court then applied the 0 'Brien 
94. Source code is computer code und ers tandable by humans. lt is where the initial creation 
of the computer program takes place. In order to be understood ("run") by a computer, source code 
must be converted into object code. This conversion is achieved by specialized computer programs 
known as compilers. These compilers take source code written in a specified language and co nvert 
(or "compile") it into object code. Typically, compilers are specifically designed for a particular 
processor, since most processors usc slightly diffe rent patterns (or "instructions") to accomplish 
th eir tasks. Source code, on the other hand , is more versatil e. As long as a compiler is available for 
a particular processor, the source code can be used to create a working program for that machine. 
Digital object code is the fund amental language, or code, of the computer, and is the building 
block for all computer codes. At root, all computer processors operate using a series of Is and Os. 
The patterns of Is and Os in object code represent the alphanumeric characters used in the source 
code. The sequence and patterns of the Is and Os cause different responses from the computer. In 
general, object code cannot be read and understood by humans-it is the exclusive domain of the 
computer. 
95. See Arms Export Control Act, 22 U.S.C. § 2778 (1994 & Supp. 1996) (authorizing the 
President to control the import and export of "defense articles"); International Traffic in Arms 
Regulations , 22 C. F.R. §§ 120-130 (1998) (creating a procedure by which the State Department 
determines whether an item is covered by the Arms Export Control Act). 
96. Given that the "wri tten" software could be typed or scanned into computer-usable form, 
this distinction raises many questions. Apparently, the government is only interested in slowing 
down the international spread of encryption software, and deems that export via printed matter 
imposes enough obstacles to suit this purpose. See Karn, 925 F. Supp. at I 0 (noting that mac hine 
readable media makes encoding by foreign intelligence sources much easier). 
97. 925 F. Supp. I. 
98. See id. at 9. The software was also printed in the definitive book on cryptography, BRUCE 
SCHNEIER, APPLIED CRYPTOG~>\PHY 623-73 (2d ed. 1996). The government did not object to the 
export of the book. See Karn , 925 F. Supp. at 3. 
99. See id. at 9-10. 
100. See id. at 10 (explaining that if the regulation were content-specific it would be "pre-
sumptively invalid," but if it were content-neutral the government can justify the regulation if other 
criteria are met). 
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test, and found the government interest to be unrelated to the suppression of 
free expression. 101 The court let the restriction stand. 
The Kam decision appears to have passed lightly over the threshold 
question and JUmped immediately to substantive analysis using the 0 'Brien 
test. By moving straight to the analysi s of the regulation , the Karn court 
found it unnecessary to resolve the status of software code under the First 
Amendment. 102 Under R.A. V and O'Brien, the cour1 noted , the govern-
ment 's rationale for the restriction is determinative. 103 The best reading of 
the case, then, is that the court used a teleological threshold test in place of 
the assumed-away ontological test. By focusing squarely upon the intent and 
reach of the governmental action, the court thus avoided the fallacies of the 
ontological, medium-specific threshold analysi s . 10·1 
The Bernstein v. United States Dep artment of State105 decision is not so 
successful at avoiding such fallacies. While the basic fact pattern is quite 
similar to Karn, 106 the Bernstein court explicitly ruled that source code is 
speech for the purposes of the First Amendment, 107 noting that "Bernstein's 
encryption system is written, albeit in computer language rather than in Eng-
lish."1 08 The court's analysi s is plagued by several fundamental fallacies. 
First, the Bernstein court's rush to formalism on the threshold question 
effectively disconnects the rationale for the decision from the support of First 
10 1. The court held: 
The defendants are not regulating the export of the di skette because of the expressive content 
of the comments and or source code , but instead are regulating because of the belief that the 
combination of encryption source code on machine readabl e media will make it easier for for-
eign intelligence sources to encode their communicati ons. 
!d. at 10. 
102. See id. at 10 ("Accordingly, it is unnecessary for the Court to make any finding regard-
ing the nature of the (purported speech). "). 
103. See id. This is markedly similar to the Supreme Court 's approach in O'Brien itself, 
where it assumed away the speech-conduct question to focus on the regulation at issue. See United 
States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376-77 ( 1968) (stating that even if burning a draft card triggered 
the First Amendment, the conduct would not be constitutionally protected if the regulation reflects a 
legitimate government interest). 
I 04. Admittedly the court avoided this in part because it simply assumed, without deciding, 
that software is speech. See Karn , 925 F. Supp. at 9-10. 
105. 922 F. Supp. 1426 (N.D. Cal. 1996). As of the date this article went to press , Bernstein 
was pending (after argument) on appeal to the Ninth Circuit. While the ultimate outcome of Bern-
stein may provide furth er clarity for the law of software described in this article, it does not affect 
the more general argument that the lower court's formalistic analysis is deeply flawed. 
106. Bernstein, a graduate student at U.C. Berkeley at the time of the 1995 filing (he is now a 
professor), wanted to publi sh his own encryption software program, Snuffle, over the Internet and 
share the software with colleagues overseas. He filed suit after the State Department deni ed his 
request. See id. at 1429-30. 
107. See id. at 1434-36, 1439. 
108. Jd at 1434-35. 
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Amendment values. The First Amendment is not about the canonization-
via constitutional status-of what can be printed out on paper, but about pre-
venting the government from proscribing expression- regardless of form-
because of disapproval of the ideas expressed. 109 Focusing on formalistic 
categories such as the written and spoken word is not only inconsistent with 
the core values of the First Amendment, but may al so result in the limiting of 
other forms of express ion, especially new media technologies . 
Second, the court applied a medium-specific threshold test, but greatly 
abstracted the selection of the medium. The court reasoned that because 
software is recorded by means of language, it is therefore "written word." 110 
And while few would contend that the "written word" is not a t-aditionally 
protected medium of expression suffi cient to trigger the Fi rst Amendment, 111 
the selection of "written word" rather than "source code" or "software" as 
the appropriate analytic medium begs the question . Given a sufficient level 
of abstraction, many things might look like the "wri tten word." More to the 
point, however, is the converse: Given an increasing level of abstraction , 
many "traditionally" protected modes of expression begin to lose their clar-
ity. The parades in Hurley begin to look like gatherings, walks, or even sim-
ply generalized conduct. Flag burning and dancing would blur into more 
generalized conduct, and music would look a lot like noise .112 This level of 
abstraction sidestep around difficult issues works both ways, of course, 113 
and the losses might be greater than the gains. 114 
109. See. e. g., R.A.V . v. St. Paul , 505 U.S. 377,382 (1992) ("The First Amendment generally 
prevents government from proscribing speech or even express ive conduct beca use of disapproval of 
the ideas expressed.") (citations omitted); Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 414 (1989) (stating that 
the key principle underlying the First Amendment is that the government may not prohibit the ex-
pression of an idea simply because soci ety finds the idea offensive). 
110. Bernstein, 922 F. Supp . at 1434-35. 
Ill. Cf Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minnesota Comm'r of Revenue, 460 U.S . 575 , 
583-85 (1983) (noting the high level of First Amendment protection given to the press). 
112. See Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S . 781 , 790 ( 1989) (drawing a di stinction be-
tween regulating noi se and regul ating music). 
113. To be fair , the relatively thin Supreme Court doctrine regarding the medium-specific 
analysis teaches little about the level of abstraction issue. But the contours of a possible resolution 
might be discerned. In Hurley , the Court probably chose to define the activity as marches or pa-
rades rather than walking or gatherings because the challenged statutory ac tion was directed at 
parades. The parade had regulat01y significance-it was the nexus of the dispute and the locus of 
the purported expression. See Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexu al Group, 515 U.S 
557, 568-69 (1995). A reasonabl e standard for the proper level of abstraction may therefore be the 
level which has regul atory significance. In Bernstein, the regulation targeted cryptographic soft-
ware (or object code and source code). See Bernstein , 922 F. Supp. at 1429; International Traffic in 
Arms Regulations, 22 C.F.R. § 121.1 XIII(b)(I) ( 1998). That is where the impacted mode of com-
munication lies. 
114. Indeed, it is interesting to note that the effect of basing the threshold test upon the me-
dium of the "written word" is such that the case does not end up lending much support to the propo-
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Finally, the Bernstein court attempted to support the proposition that 
software is speech by noting that since much computer software is subject to 
protection under the Copyright Act as a " literary work,"115 and copyright law 
protects "expression," then software must be expression. 11 6 While thi s 
statement has some formalistic appeal (surely the term "expression" must be 
consistent across different legal disciplines?) , furth er mvestigation undercuts 
its logic. First, the scope of copyright protection is statutory, not constitu-
tional. 117 Second, in many ways, copyright law is a curtailment of free ex-
pression, closely skirting the First Amendment. 11 8 Thus, there is no reason to 
think that the conceptions of "expression" are similar, much less coextensive. 
Third , in order to reconcile the apparent conf1ict, copyright doctrine specifi-
cally excludes ideas from protection .119 The copyrightable remaining work 
is known as the expression .120 In stark contrast, ideas are fundamental to the 
First Amendment conception of expression. 121 Therefore, the term "expres-
sion" cannot be interchanged between copyright and First Amendment doc-
trine , and locating the penumbra of First Amendment protections by refer-
s ition that software is speech , since the court 's logical reasoning ex tends onl y as far as the uncon-
troversial argument that the written word triggers the First Amendment. 
115. Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 102(a)( l) (1994); accord Apple Computer, 
Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp. , 714 F.2d 1240, 1249 (3d Cir. 1983) ("ll1us a computer program, 
whether in obj ect code or source code, is a 'literary work ' . ... "). 
116. See Bernstein, 922 F. Supp. at 1436. 
11 7. See PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT, PATENT, TRA DEMARK AND RELATED STATE 
DOCTRINES 552-53 (1997) (discussing the nature and origin of United States copyri ght law). 
118. See generally Paul Goldstein, Copyright and the First Amendment, 70 COLUM. L. REV. 
983 (1970) (discuss ing the conflict between copyright law and the First Amendment); Mel ville B. 
Nimmer, Does Copyright Abridge First Amendment Guarantees of Free Speech and Press?, 17 
UCLA L. REV. 1180 (1970) (discussing policy considerations related to a balance of free speech 
and copyright interests). Nonetheless, these commentators note that copyright's incentives for free 
expression may enhance the free exchange of ideas. See Goldstein, supra at 990-91 (noting that the 
economic incentive of copyright theoretically ensures a wide range of creative subject matter); 
Nimmer, supra at 1186 (stating that copyright law is based on the idea that monopoly is a necessary 
stimulus to the full realization of creative activities). 
119. The idea-expression dichotomy is codified in 17 U.S.C. § l 02(b) ( 1994) ("'n no case 
does copyright protection for an original work of authorship exttnd to any idea . ... "). See Sid & 
Marty Krofft Television Prod., Inc. v. McDonald's Corp. , 562 F.2d 1157, 1170 (9th Cir. 1977) 
(" [T]he idea-expression dichotomy already serves to accommodate the competing interests of copy-
right and the first amendment.") ; see also Fantasy, Inc. v. Fogerty, 664 F. Supp. 1345, 1351 (N.D. 
Cal. 1987) (citing Sid & Marty, 562 F.2d at 11 70). 
120. See Sid & Marty, 562 F.2d at 1163 ("It is an axiom of copyright law that the protection 
granted to a copyrighted work extends only to the particular expression of the idea and never to the 
idea itself."). 
121. See. e.g., Cohen v. California , 403 U.S. 15, 26 ( 1971) (stating that expression "conveys 
not only ideas capable of relatively precise, detached explication, but otherwise inexpressible emo-
tions as well") ; Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 ( 1927) ("[F]reedom to think as you will 
and to speak as you think are means indispensable to the discovery and spread of .. . truth. ") (Bran-
deis, J ., concurring). 
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ence to those protections of the Copyright Act is profoundly inappropriate. 122 
Whether a particular software product may be protected under the Copyright 
Act is simply not rele vant to First Amendment analysis. 
The court in Junger v. Daley 123 steered an approximate middle path be-
tween the Karn and Bernstein decisions. Holding that "although encryption 
source code may occasionally be expressive, its export is not protected con-
duct under the First Amendment," 124 the Junger court perfom1ed a two-tier 
ontological analys is: first, a medium-based analys is of encryption source 
code; and second, a speech-conduct analysis of the exporter 's activities . 
While at first glance thi s bifurcated ontological analysis may seem promis-
ing, a closer look exposes a fa miliar set of weaknesses . 
Initi a lly, the court 's medium-based analysis assumed a seemingly limit-
less number of mediums within the "medium" of software code: "Certain 
software is inherently expressive . .. . other software is inherently func-
tional. " 125 Finding source code for encryption software to be especially 
functional rather than expressive, the court noted that "[m]ore than describ-
ing encryption, the software carries out the function of encryption . ... In 
doing thi s function , the encryp tion software is indistinguishable from dedi-
cated computer hardware that does encryption."126 
The parsing of the " medium" of software code does little to improve the 
failing of medium-based analyses .127 First, the opinion continues to condi-
tion First Amendment protection on the choice of medium. 128 To the Junger 
court, choices within the software genre will determine the outcome rather 
than the choice of software as a medium of expression. This is no less trou-
blesome than a broader categorization, of course: Decisions "approving" 
certain forms of software code as First Amendment mediums will sti ll un-
derprotect new, unlitigated forms. 129 
In distinguishing among apparent sub-mediums in software code, the 
Junger court pointed to the functional identity between encrypted source 
122. There is another, perhaps as damaging, argument against the use of copyright analogies 
in this contex t: It plays straight into the hands of the "func tional" argument. That is, the so-call ed 
"useful arti cles" exception to copyright law, codified in 17 U.S .C. § 101 (1994 & Supp. 1996), 
limits the scope of copyright protection to pictorial, graphic, and other visua l works by excluding 
usefu l aspects of the work. See Brandir Int ' l, Inc . v. Cascade Pac. Lumber Co., 834 F.2d 1142, 
1143 (2d Cir. 1987) (discussing this limitation). 
123. 8 F. Supp. 2d 708 (N.D. Ohio 1998). 
124. /d. at 715. 
125. !d. at 7 16. 
126. ld 
127. See notes 54-76 supra and accompanying text. 
128. See Junger, 8 F. Supp. 2d at 71 6 ("In reviewing governmental regulation of computer 
software, the Court need examine the software involved."). 
129. See notes 75-76 supra and accompanying text. 
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code and dedicated computer hardware. 130 This , of course, is not particularly 
helpful; software code, by definition, perfom1s the function of instructing 
computer hardware to act. The more important (and interesting) part of thi s 
analysis is that the court based its dec is10n in part on the results of the source 
code- that is, the acts that the software seeks to have the hardware perform. 
The court seemed to say that because encryption code is not protec ted by the 
F irst Amendment, the software that "carries out the function of encryp tion" 
does not receive uniform protection 131 Significantly, the focus on results 
implicitly removes the "medium" question to a fom1 of conduct analysis. 
That is, the issue becomes whether the results of the software code are ex-
pressive or simply functional. 
However, comparing expression versus fu nctionality for software is no 
less difficult than measuring speech versus conduct for human behavior. 132 
A software-hardware combination that performs encryption is quite likely to 
be both expression and function-both the act of encrypting and a statement 
about encryption policy. Again, the undifferentiated whole. 133 
After determining that encryption source code is rarely expressive, the 
Junger court moved to a more traditional speech-conduct analysis of the act 
of exporting encryption source code . Applying Spence, the court determined 
that the export of source code does not convey an unmistakable message, 
ostensibly because the code itself is not sufficiently expressive. 134 This, of 
course, is ontology upon ontology. In essence, the Junger opinion concludes 
that because the purported speaker chose an unexpressive medium of com-
munication, transmitting the purported expression cannot be speech. The 
choice of medium is again dispositive; the speech-conduct outcome is pre-
determined. 
In the end, Junger upheld the export regulations for reasons as question-
able as the Bernstein court's opposite conclusion. 135 Although the court rec-
ognized the fallacy of Bernstein's "speech is writing" analysis, 136 and fo-
cused instead on the functionality of the medium of source code, this func·· 
tionality determination-as merely a different fom1 of medium-based analy-
sis-is little better than the misguided formalism used by the Bernstein court. 
130. See Junger, 8 F. Supp. 2d at 716. 
131. !d. 
132. See notes 41-53 supra and accompanying text. 
133 . See Ely, supra note 2, at 1495. 
134. See Junger, 8 F. Supp. 2d at 7 17-1 8 ("Because the expressive elements of encryption 
so urce code are neither 'unmistakable' nor ' overwhel mingly apparent ' its export is not protected 
conduct under the First Amendment.") (citing Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community Sch. Dist., 
393 U.S. 503 , 505-06 ( 1969) and Texas v. Johnson, 49 1 U.S. 397, 406 ( 1989)). 
135 . See notes I 05-122 supra and accompanying tex t. 
136. See note I 08 supra and accompanying text. 
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Neither the Kanz nor the B ernstein case directly addressed the applica-
tion of computer software to the other ontological mode of threshold anal y-
sis: the speech-conduct distinction.137 As noted above, the speech-conduct 
distinction rests upon the fallacy that the expressive elements in any action 
can be separated from the conduct. 138 As Junger amply demonstrates, there 
is no reason to believe that software \viii have any special immunity from 
thi s problem. Indeed, if there ever was conduct that was an "undifferentiated 
whole" of action and expression , the use and operation of computer code 
would seem to be it. 139 The hypothetical programmer Debra is both acting 
and expressing when she releases Lucifer onto the Internet; trying to separate 
the two elements of her activity would be no easier than it would for the 
burning of draft cards. 140 
The analysis of software under the speech-conduct distinction is prob-
lemati c because computer code is primarily, perhaps even exclusively, func -
tional. This inherent, and possibly overwhelming, functional aspect serves to 
undennine a speaker's claim that the development or use of computer soft-
ware is intended to convey a particularized message . If Johnson had been 
burning hi s flag for wannth, or O'Brien using his draft card to start hi s bar-
becue, the Court would have been hard-pressed to find sufficient elements of 
expression to warrant First Amendment protection. The Bernstein court 
dismissed this argument as "immaterial," comparing computer software to 
recipes, instructions, and do-it-yourself manuals, which it noted are also 
speech.141 But the analogies don ' t fit. Each of these examples is itself used 
to communicate infonnation between people; software, to the extent it can be 
considered a set of instructions, communicates only to machines. While it is 
true that there is no exception to the First Amendment for useful speech, w 
this argument presupposes the existence of speech. After all, the First 
Amendment does not protect products. 143 
137. The gove rnment's primary contention in Bem slein appears to have been that software it-
se lf was conduct rather than speech, and could thus be regulated . See Bernstein v. United States 
Dep ' t of State, 922 F. Supp. 1426, 1434 (N.D. Cal. 1996). As I demonstrate below, this was not the 
most helpful appro ach. 
13 8. See notes 42-50 supra and accompanying text. 
139 . Thi s statement sets as ide the obvious d istincti on between the actual software code 
(source or obj ect) and the commenls , if any, inse rted into the sou rce code to make it more readab le 
for humans. Comments, which add nothing to the operation or function of the software , would be 
f•1 lly protected by the First Amendment irrespective of the sta tus of the software itself. 
140. See United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376 (1968) (refusing to decide defi niti vely if 
0 ' Brien 's actions could constitute speech). 
141 . See Bernslein , 922 F. S upp . at 1435. 
142. See id. 
143. See Winter v. G.P. Putnam 's Sons, 938 F.2d 1033 , 1036 (9th Cir. 199 1) (contras ting, for 
First Amendment purposes, "products ," such as aeronautical charts , with "ideas and express ion in a 
book"). 
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III. TH E BEST LA W OF S OFTWARE IS N O L AW OF SO FTWA RE 
As thi s note has demonstrated, the "law of software'' is still unsettled . 
The three cases that have addressed the issue are split in their ultimate hold-
ings as far as the First Amendment status of source code. These decisions 
are undercut by a seri es of fallacies and misunderstandings. The vvildly di-
vergent holdings and troublesome analyses of Bernstein and Junger demon-
strate that the already weakened ontological approach to First Amendment 
analysi s cannot support the weight of new mediums of communication , and 
that software is not- and should not be- "a law unto itself."l.J.J 
The teleological mode of analysis is a more analytically sound method 
for evaluating the scope of First Amendment protection for software. This 
method, of course, tell s us nothing about the protection given to the medium 
of computer softw are , except that software will receive neither favorable nor 
unfavorable treatment. Furthermore, a teleological method of analysis will 
neither hinder nor help software 's status as a developing technology. By not 
according special constitutional status to different forms or types of software, 
the law avoids distorting the market for software and related technologies. 
However attractive it might be in the abstract to develop a " law of soft-
ware"- to perhaps once and for all put software beyond the scope of gov-
ernment regulators- --<:areful analysis reveals that the best law of software is 
no law of software. Technology inexorably develops ; we simply cannot 
know how it will change our world or why. But we can be sure that software 
is far from the last new mode of communications to come down the pike. 
Therefore, as the Court clearly stated in Denver Area Educational Telecom-
munications Consortium, Inc. v. FCC: 145 
"[N]o definitive choice among competing analogies ... allows us to declare a 
rigid single standard, good for now and for all future media and pur-
poses . ... Rather, aware as we are of the changes taking place in the law, the 
technology, and the industrial structure, related to [this industry], we believe it 
unwise and unnecessary definitely to pick one analogy or one specific set of 
words now ." 146 
In the context of computer software, focusing on the medium would be the 
mistake. 
144. Metromedia, Inc . v. San Diego, 453 U.S. 490,501 (1981). 
145. ll6S.Ct. 2374 (1996). 
146. !d. at 2385 (citations omitted). 
